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Often it takes an outsider to give us insights into our own activity or discipline.
Such is the situation with the present volume. Leon Grunberg with training in edu
cation and sociology gained in the UK and the U.S., offers much food for thought
_ not just for professors in colleges of business, but also for managers in large
companies and consultants in market or financial research firms.
The heart of the book consists of three major case studies from the turbulent mid
1970s. Two are from the automotive and one is from the office equipment field.
British Leyland acquires but then abandons Innocenti of Italy; Chrysler pulls off a
threatened withdrawal from the UK, if only for three years; and Litton Industries
woos then discards Imperial Typewriters of Britain, turning a "cash cow" into a
"dog." An appropriate subtitle for each case might have been: Life in the multina
tional corporate jungle - how large firms romance smaller ones - how they find
them, milk them, and leave them.
The reading is lively in each of the three case study chapters. The author has
been able to dig out astonishing details from corporate files and from interviews
with numerous - but anonymous - executives. He also tracked down dusty gov
ernment reports, obscure journal articles and such gems as a doctoral disserta
tion written in Milan. But we get more than juicy tidbits or petty accusations;
Grunberg is able to pull together sensitive information from various sources,
cross-check them to a great extent, and then glean insights from his interviews.
At the end of the book, the case studies are combined in order to offer some use
ful generalizations, though not policy recommendations.
Several threads run through the text. Some of these are tackled well; some are
dealt with in a cursory fashion, and still others are swept under the rug. Thus, Grun
berg deals well with his central question: How and why do parent firms divest
subsidiaries in an international setting? He is also skillful in demonstrating the
interaction between and the strength of both external forces (economic condi
tions, competition, and so on) and internal forces (individual and group power
plays, machinations by parent and subsidiary managers). But the author does not
weight these factors in any meaningful fashion; and, despite lengthy references
to prior studies, he does not relate well his findings to those of others. Finally, the
impact of divestments on workers, customers, and communities is barely touched
upon, despite promises to the contrary. Grunberg vacillates between reining in
multinationals or letting them loose in today's competitive markets. The call for
more disclosure, longer layoff notices, and consulting with governments is made,
but in a rather perfunctory manner; at least, there is no recommendation for bu
reaucratic rules and regulations.
The two brief introductory chapters which explore the nature of international di
vestment are the weakest part of the book. While the chapters are short, they seem
tedious. Simplistic or awkward statements, dry documentation, and failure to ex
tract meaningful data from previous works characterize these pages. The causes
and consequences of divestment in a global setting are really not probed at great
length or in great depth. (Chapter 2 on this topic offers eight pages of text and
three pages of forty footnotes, many with multiple references.) The data mar
shalled should have been put into tables or appendices. Vague statements such
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as the following one on page 15 should be deleted: "Hopefully, they (the case
studies) will indicate whether we are on the right lines and perhaps point out
areas that we have missed altogether."
Chapter 3 is a defense of the author's methodology- but there is no need to apol
ogize. Grunberg calls his painstaking collection of information "the long march."
Getting inside large firms, tracking down willing executives, cross-checking the
details obtained with others constitute an incomplete process, a judgment
convenience sample. Certainly, not every folder could be obtained, not every
executive was willing to speak even anonymously or off the record. But Grunberg
was able to elicit comments from many; he seldom entered an interview without
already having data on hand. This way, he involved his subjects; approached the
topic from different angles, and arrived at a generally well balanced view of the
process and the outcome.
In the reconstruction of what happened in each of the three major cases - Chap
ters 4 through 6 - the author follows a sensible format: reasons for the acquisition;
factors affecting the performance of the subsidiary; the process of withdrawal and
the consequences for the parties involved; and, reasons for the actual or threat
ened divestiture. Grunberg's analysis is at its best when he focuses on the parent
subsidiary working accord and on such specific topics as transfer pricing, com
petition, layoffs, product and marketing strategy. The evidence is quite clear that
the parent uses centralization and planning to achieve control and coordination.
There is much turmoil, bargaining and "wheeling-dealing." The parent prevails
not only because it has a broader view and heavier responsibilities, but because
it has the clout; the subsidiary is often kept in the dark even about its present or
future role. (An analogy with the human family is tempting!)
The British Leyland-Innocenti relationship pits a large, lethargic multinational
against a previously well-managed small Italian firm. The weak parent puts the
adverse impact of recessionary and competitive forces on the shoulder of the
subsidiary, thereby "exporting its crisis." But ultimately, as one punster put it, the
guilty as well as the innocent shall perish. The Chrysler UK case foreshadows the
enormous problems which finally beset the large U.S. parent in the late 1970s.
What is surprising here is how Chrysler was able to buy time, display favoritism
toward other subsidiaries and still manage to stave off defeat on the British front
- at least for three years. And the Litton Industries-Imperial case illustrates fur
ther how parent firms have favorite kids (in this case Triumph-Adler) and less
favored children (that is, Imperial). The former get the chocolate, the latter the
breadcrumbs. With a dated product line and a circumscribed marketing plan, Im
perial did not have much of a chance to grow to successful maturity.
Chapter 7 pulls together the common findings from the three major cases quite
well; Chapter 8, by contrast, is far too brief as a concluding statement and offers
no policy recommendations whatsoever. The author is able to demonstrate in his
review of the three cases that there is more to the failure of multinational ven·
tures than "the conventional wisdom." Yes, subsidiaries fail because they have
not done well in a sharply competitive marketplace. But similar firms have pre
vailed. It turns out that the foreign subsidiaries could handle their local rivals, but
not those from other countries. The key factor which broke the subsidiaries' back
was the encroachment of the parents on their (the subsidiaries') discretionary
powers. The internal, political environment - rife with power plays by individuals
and groups - proved to be too great an obstacle. Grunberg would argue: Give the
child a chance to grow up. But, alas, life is not as simple; when a parent has a
wide-flung family, some members may have to be reined in and starved, so that
others may live.
Positive facets of this volume range from a lively narrative to in depth analysis of
three significant cases, from the discovery of sensitive information to a broader
perspective than a narrow managerial view. Negative features include minutiae
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and trivia scattered throughout the text which do detract from the analysis; the
lack of weighing the factors responsible for the demise of acquired subsidiaries;
and the failure to link the findings to results reported by others (for example, Sachdev, Torneden). On balance, the positive features outweigh the negative ones by
an order of 3:1.
Andrew C. Gross
The Cleveland State University

